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A minor child may establish his own best interests for purposes of
the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction
By Juli Campagna

De Silva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d 1279 (10th
Cir. 2007)

A

child’s testimony that he prefers to
stay with the parent who wrongfully
retained him in violation of the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Convention) may
be sufficient to overcome the petitioning
parent’s right to have the child promptly returned to his country of habitual residence.
The 10th Circuit held that a 13-year-old
boy’s in camera interview with a magistrate
judge—where neither the parents nor their
counsel were in attendance—provided sufficient evidence to defeat a repatriation claim
brought by his mother, with whom he was
living, in Canada.
The Convention protects children from
wrongful removal or retention in a foreign
country and establishes procedures for their
return. The Convention applies to all children under the age of sixteen. A remedy is
available only when the child was removed
from a signatory country to the Convention
and retained in another signatory country.
Both Canada and the United States are states
parties to the Convention. In the U.S. implementing legislation for the Convention, Congress declared that “persons should not be
permitted to obtain custody of children by
virtue of their wrongful removal or retention.”
International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(ICARA), 42 U.S.C. §§11601-11610. Courts are
specifically directed to decide cases in accordance with the Convention.
In an action for the return of a child to the
habitual residence, a petitioner must prove
only that the child was removed or retained

“wrongfully.” Under Article 3 of the Convention, the removal of a child is wrongful when
it breaches the custody rights of a person, an
institution or any other body, either jointly or
alone, under the law of the State where the
child was habitually resident immediately
before the removal or retention; and the party with custody was actually exercising those
rights at the time of removal or retention, or
would have exercised those rights but for the
removal or retention. Habitual residence is
the ordinary residence of the child prior to removal. A person can have only one habitual
residence.1
Under Article 19 of the Convention, the
court’s authority is limited to determining
the merits of the abduction claim. It may not
decide the merits of the underlying custody
claim. The federal implementing legislation
grants concurrent jurisdiction to state and
federal courts to hear ICARA claims.
Petitioner must establish that the removal was wrongful by a preponderance of the
evidence.2 A respondent who opposes the
return of a child may advance four defenses
set out in the Convention.3 All defenses are
narrowly construed.4 In this case, however,
the court did not look to any of the four affirmative defenses. Instead, it based its decision on a fifth consideration found in Article
13 of the Convention. As the court noted, this
consideration is left to the court’s discretion
and “allows for refusal to order the return of
a child where ‘the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree
of maturity at which it is appropriate to take
into account of its views.’”5 What the court
failed to note is that the same article requires

the court to “take into account the information relating to the social background of
the child provided by the Central Authority
or other component authority of the child’s
residence” when considering this or any of
the four affirmative defenses.6 There was no
evidence that such information was sought,
submitted, or weighed.
Although the court did not follow the
Convention in applying the “age and maturity” exception, it did look to case law for
guidance. When applying the “age and maturity” exception as the sole basis for refusing to repatriate a child, courts must apply
a stricter standard than they would if the
child’s wishes were part of a broader analysis.7 If the court finds that the child has been
unduly influenced or indoctrinated by the
retaining parent, the court will not take the
child’s wishes into account.8 The court called
the inquiry both fact intensive and idiosyncratic.
The parents of Jonathan Pitts, a 13-yearold, were in a custody dispute at the time of
the ICARA action. Jonathan spent the summer of 2005 at his father’s home in Oklahoma. He traveled on a round-trip ticket from
Canada, where he lived with his mother.
Jonathan had lived with his mother since infancy. They had lived in her native Sri Lanka
for nine years before fleeing to Canada in
2003. He and his father had stayed in touch,
and this was not his first trip to Oklahoma.
The father wanted to keep his son in Oklahoma, and had told him so on earlier visits.
Jonathan testified that he had not felt ready
to stay there until the summer of 2005.
Although his mother brought an immedi-
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ate claim, the federal district court refused to
order Jonathan’s return to Canada. While noting that “courts in signatory nations take violations of the Convention very seriously,” the
court rejected the mother’s argument that
the child had been swayed by his father’s lavish gifts and lifestyle.
The factors supporting this court’s application of the “age and maturity exception”
were the child’s intelligence, his ability to express himself, and his well-developed understanding of his situation and his parents’ positions. In Canada, he told the magistrate, he
had a sister with whom he got along as well
as a lot of friends. He had also made friends in
Oklahoma, and had joined the football and
wrestling teams there. His father’s house was

“really big.” His dad had given him “a computer and everything he needed for school.” He
told the court that he wanted to stay in his
father’s town because he thought the school
was better. There is no evidence that he had
ever attended the school. Based on this testimony, the court found that Jonathan had
made his decision “without apparent adult
indoctrination.”
Ms. De Silva, a Sri Lankan refugee living in
Canada, argued the appeal pro se.
The 10th Circuit found that the refusal to
order the child returned was not an abuse of
discretion.
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